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The Binding Force of International
Arbitral Awardst
WILLILM W. PARK*

JAN PAULSSON**

A party that submits a controversy to arbitration may later regret having abandoned recourse to the courts. Once the award is
rendered, the chosen arbitrator may no longer seem so wise to the
losing party, who may refuse to comply with his decision. A legal
system must therefore legitimize the arbitrator's authority if the
award is to be more than an unenforceable attempt at conciliation.
The country where the award is rendered traditionally has legitimized arbitral authority subject to conditions in the form of
mandatory procedural rules imposed on the arbitral proceedings.
The proper scope of these local norms-commonly referred to as
the lex loci arbitri-remainsunsettled. Proponents of "denationalized" arbitration assert that arbitral awards may be detached from
the law of the country of the proceedings and yet remain
enforceable.
Courts may supervise arbitral proceedings to ensure legally correct results. Under an alternate approach, however, arbitration is
subject to judicial control only to safeguard its fundamental fairness. A third view would free arbitration from any constraints imt 0 William W. Park and Jan Paulsson, 1983.
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posed by the legal system of the place where the award is rendered.
These alternative patterns for judicial intervention involve competing values that are not easily reconciled. The commercial community desires finality in private dispute resolution. But national
judicial systems may wish to protect other values, such as the integrity of the adjudicatory process and respect for the rights of
third parties.
The first part of this Article explores the various approaches to
the control normally exercised over international commercial arbitration by the place of the proceedings. The second part examines
the recent history of English arbitration law as an illustration of
how a nation's legislators and judges may struggle to reconcile the
rival goals of justice and finality in the private resolution of international business disputes.
I.
A.

THE

LEX Loci

ARBITRI

Territorialityof the Lex Arbitri

In the traditional view, arbitration inevitably is controlled by
some national law, a lex arbitri.1 The lex arbitri is not necessarily
the law governing the substance of the dispute, nor the procedural
rules applied by the arbitrators. Rather, the lex arbitri governs the
validity of the arbitral process itself. Furthermore, the law of the
arbitration is the law of the place of the proceedings: the lex arbitri is the lex loci arbitri. Thus an arbitrator must bow to the
mandatory norms of the country in which he sits. 2 Parties may

choose the law governing the contract as well as some of the procedural rules applied by the arbitrator, such as whether or not the
cross examination of witnesses will be allowed. The parties cannot,
however, choose the law governing the arbitration, except indirectly through choice of its situs.
The rules imposed by the lex loci arbitriare not easily classified.
Many legal systems prohibit arbitration of disputes involving sen1. As one commentator put it, "[e]very right or power a private person enjoys is inexorably conferred by or derived from a system of municipal law which may conveniently and in
accordance with tradition be called lex fori, though it would be more exact (but also less
familiar) to speak of the lex arbitri."Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in International Arbitration: Liber Amicorum for Martin Domke 157, 159 (P. Sanders ed. 1967).
2. For the present discussion, the place of the arbitral proceedings is assumed to be the
place where the award is rendered. The parties may choose the place explicitly or delegate
the choice to an arbitral institution.
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sitive public interests, such as the protection of investors in corporate securities$ or contracts with state agencies. 4 Some require arbitrators to state the reasons for their awards,5 or provide for the
removal of arbitrators who are inept" or unfair. A few legal systems have provided for appeal from arbitrator error on matters of

law."
Scholars and practitioners have questioned the traditional role
of the lex loci arbitri, and have suggested that an international

commercial arbitral award may "float" free from the constraints of
the national law of the place of the proceedings.9 In this view, "the
binding force of an international award may be derived.., with-

out a specific national legal system serving as its foundation."' 0
One of the authors has argued that an international arbitral award

is enforceable regardless of whether it is subject to the same appellate procedures as domestic ones.11 Such denationalized arbitration

is consistent not only with the finality sought by parties active in
international commerce, but also with the desire of many countries
to increase their attractiveness as a site for arbitration, which in
part underlies the trend toward greater arbitral autonomy in modern arbitration law.1 2 Denationalized arbitration also allows courts

to avoid involvement in disputes that do not involve domestic interests, and accommodates international business transactions in

3. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
4. See, e.g., Carbonneau, The Elaboration of a French Doctrine on International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Liberal Civilian Creativity, 55 TuL L. Rev. 1, 29-30 (1980).
5. See, e.g., Bilow, Glossner & Laschet, Federal Republic of Germany, in Arbitration Law
in Europe 83, 90 (International Chamber of Commerce 1981).
6. See, e.g., English Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 27. § 23 (concerning arbitrator
"misconduct").
7. See, e.g., Nouveau code de procedure civile [C. pr. civ. nouveau] art. 1502(4) (Supp.
1981) (Fr.).
8. See infra notes 48-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the English "case
stated" procedure.
9. See generally Lalive, Les rfgles de confiit de lois appliqu6es au fond du litige par
rarbitre international si6gant en Suisse, 1976 Revue de rArbitrage 155; Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound. Award Detached from the Law of Its Country of Origin, 30 Int'l & Comp.
L.Q. 358 (1981). Denationalized arbitration produces what some have termed an "a-national
award." See A. van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958, at 28-51
(1981).
10. Paulsson, supra note 9, at 368. The legal system of the place of arbitration does not
necessarily have the "authority to rule on the validity of the proceedings as such-and thus
on the binding effect of its result: the award." Id. See also Paulsson, France and the Arbitral
Process in 1980: A New Law and a Major Court Decision, 1981 Skiljedom 40, 42.
11. See Paulsson, supra note 9, at 368-70.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 77-83.
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which the parties' nationalities create a special need for a neutral
and private forum.13
Denationalized arbitration, however, has come to imply more
than self-restraint by the country of the proceedings in the imposition of local procedural law. Under certain conditions, awards rendered in the context of international trade may be enforceable
outside the country of proceedings despite annulment where rendered. For example, suppose an arbitral award rendered in country
A is set aside there on the ground that the parties did not validly
consent to arbitration. Should a court in country B, where the loser
has assets, nevertheless enforce the award if it takes a contrary
view of the validity of the arbitration agreement? What should B's
court do if A's court sets aside the award for error of law, a ground
for annulment unknown in B's law?
Varying degrees of detached arbitration are possible. For instance, B might take the position that annulment in A is never
relevant to enforcement in B. Or, annulment of an award in A
might constitute an impediment to enforcement in B only if the
annulment was made for reasons considered appropriate under B's
law. For example, B might accept annulment for arbitrator corruption, but not for arbitrator error of law.
Both traditionalists and proponents of denationalized arbitration acknowledge that B's courts could always deny recognition to
an arbitration defective under their own standards, presuming of
course that they are consistent with treaty obligations. The divisive issue is whether B's courts should also defer to A's nullification for violation of A's procedural law.
At least until the enactment of the Arbitration Act of 1979, English judges traditionally have given the lex loci arbitri greater significance than their French or U.S. counterparts. In one extreme
decision, the Court of Appeal held that the selection of London as
a situs for arbitration implied that English law governed the issue
14
of contract damages.
French courts have at least toyed with a markedly different approach. In the Gotaverken case, 1 5 for example, a French court de-

13. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974).
14. Tzortzis v. Monark Line A/B, [1968] 1 W.L.R. 406, 411-12 (C.A.) (Lord Denning,
M.R.).
15. Judgment of Feb. 21, 1980, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1980 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence (D.S. Jur.] 568. The arbitration in Gotaverken involved three tankers constructed by
a Swedish shipyard for a Libyan government agency. The Libyans refused delivery on the
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clined to hear a Libyan challenge to an arbitral award that arguabased on
bly violated French public policy. The court's refusal was
16
the conclusion that the arbitral award was not French.

grounds that the ship components had been made in Israel in violation of Libyan boycott
law. The arbitrators ordered the Libyans to take delivery of the vessels and to pay the
outstanding portion of the price. Paulsson, supra note 9, at 364. For an English translation
of part of Gotaverken, see id. at 385-87. For a discussion of the Gotaverken case in Sweden,
see infra note 49.
16. 1980 D.S. Jur. at 569. Gotaverken caused speculation that an arbitral award may be
free from control by the country of origin, and precipitated the French Decree of May 12,
1981 on arbitration. Decree No. 81-500, May 12, 1981, 1981 Journal Officiel de la Rkpublique Frangaise [J.O.] 1380, 1981 Dalloz-Sirey, Legislation [D.S.L.] 222. The prospect of denationalized arbitration raised concerns that an award rendered in France might not receive
enthusiastic recognition outside France. See Craig, Park & Paulsson, French Codification of
a Legal Framework for International Commercial Arbitration: The Decree of May 12, 1981,
13 L. & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 727, 733-34 (1981). The enforcement forum, mindful of the lack of
control over the arbitration's fairness in the place of the proceedings, might subject French
awards to stricter scrutiny. In addition, grounds for refusing recognition under the New
York Convention might be construed broadly when awards are rendered under a reign of
arbitral anarchy.
The Decree of May 12, 1981 provided for limited judicial control over the integrity of
international arbitration conducted in France. The Nouveau Code de ProcedureCivile now
contains the following specific grounds for challenge to an international award rendered in
France:
1. If there was no valid arbitration agreement or the arbitrator decided on the
basis of a void or expired agreement;
2. If there were irregularities in the composition of the arbitral tribunal or in
the designation of the sole arbitrator;,
3. If the arbitrator has decided in a manner incompatible with the mission
conferred upon him;
4. Whenever due process [literally:. the principle of adversarial process) has
not been respected;
5. If the recognition or enforcement is contrary to international public policy.
C. pr. civ. nouveau art. 1502 (Supp. 1981). The fifth ground for challenge refers to the public
policy of France, rather than to an international norm. Mandatory French public policy will
impose itself less extensively when the dispute has an international character. See 1 H. Batiffol & P. Lagarde, Droit international priv6 366 (6th ed. 1974). On the requirement that
an international award respect French ordre public international, see P. Fouchard,
L'Arbitrage commercial international §§ 515-528 (1965). With the exception of the public
policy, or ordre public, ground, the French measure is strikingly similar to section 10 of the
U.S. Arbitration Act. See infra note 41.
Control of an arbitral proceeding according to these standards provides the loser in an
unfair proceeding with the opportunity to have the award set aside where rendered. Without
such norms imposed by the lex loci arbitri,the losing party would be required to defend
against the enforcement of the award wherever he had assets. Moreover, the country where
the award debtor's property is may be an even more fortuitous and less acceptable forum
than the country of the proceedings. An award rendered by a corrupt arbitrator in London
should be susceptible to annulment in London. Fairness dictates that the losing party not
be required to defend against an award in another country, where the local judge may be
even less concerned with the dispute than his English counterpart.
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Several months after Gotaverken, however, the Paris Cour
d'appel reaffirmed the continuing role of the lex loci arbitri in
France. In Berardi v. Clair,17 following arbitration in Switzerland
of a dispute between French and Canadian parties, the Paris Tribunal de grand instance granted leave to enforce the award in
France.18 Three months later, the cantonal Cour de justice in Geneva annulled the award as "arbitrary."19 The Paris Cour d'appel
then quashed the lower court decision, refusing recognition in
France to an award set aside under the law of the place where
rendered.20
Under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 2 commonly referred to
as the New York Convention, the forum in which enforcement is
sought may refuse recognition of an award set aside in the country
where rendered.22 The Convention's language, however is permissive and not mandatory. 23 The French court's belief that the Convention required refusal was clearly erroneous.

A possible explanation for the variance in the court's behavior is
that Berardi v. Clair was decided under the 1955 version of the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration rules, which
provided that the law of the country in which the arbitrator holds
the proceedings (the lex loci arbitri)fill any gaps in the procedural
rules.24 In contrast, the 1975 version provides for the a bitrator

17. Judgment of June 20, 1980, No. 11542, Cour d'appel, Paris (unpublished opinion),

summarized in 7 Y.B. Com. Arb. 319-21 (International Council for Commercial Arbitration
1982).
18. 7 Y.B. Com. Arb. at 320.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter cited as New York
Convention]. See generally A. van den Berg, supra note 9.
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States are all parties to the New York Convention; the 59 countries that have ratified the Convention are listed in Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, U.N. Dec. ST/LEG/Ser.E/1 (1981), and in 7 Y.B.
Com. Arb., supra note 17, at 288-89.

22. New York Convention, supra note 21, art. V(1)(e)
23. The Convention provides that recognition of a foreign award "may be refused" on
proof that it has been set aside by "a competent authority of the country in which, or under
the law of which, that award was made." Id. art. V(1). Annulment by an authority of the
country "under the law of which" an award is made suggests the possibility that the lex
arbitri may not be the law of the place of proceedings.
24. See International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration (2d
ed. 1959).

1983]

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS

himself to fill such gaps25
Post-annulment recognition of an award rendered abroad may
be appropriate in three circumstances. The first would require that
the arbitration arise under the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration,2 6 known as the Geneva Convention
of 1961, covering disputes between nationals of different contracting States. Annulment of an award in its country of origin
constitutes a ground for refusal of recognition under the Geneva
Convention only when annulment is for specifically enumerated
reasons, such as the invalidity of the arbitral agreement or lack of
proper notice to the parties.27 Thus, if Canada had adhered to the
Geneva Convention, the award in Berardi v. Clair would apparently have been enforceable in France, since "arbitrariness" is not
a ground for annulment under the Convention.
Secondly, enforcement of an award annulled in its country of origin might be expected where the local judiciary is corrupt or biased. For example, a judge in a country lacking a tradition of judicial independence might set aside an award rendered against his
own government merely to please the bureaucracy, without regard
to the fairness of the proceedings. Enforcement of such an award
by a country where the debtor government has assets would seem
appropriate.
Thirdly, post-annulment recognition might also be justified
where the award was set aside for reasons so peculiar to the local
law of the place of the proceedings that non-recognition of it would
defeat the goals of the New York Convention. This third set of
circumstances is discussed more fully in the next section.
B.

The Lex Arbitri in Contemporary Practice
1.

The Principle of Denationalization

Proponents of detachment

s

do not advocate a complete escape

25. Rules for the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration art. 11, reprinted in 1 International Commercial Arbitration, doc. IV.A.3, at 42 (C. Schmitthoff ed.

1982) [hereinafter cited as 1975 ICC Rules].
26. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21, 1961, 484

U.N.T.S. 349.
27. Id. art. 9, 384 U.N.T.S. at 374, 376.
28. On detachment, see generally Paulsson, supra note 9, at 358-64, 375.87; Paulsson,
Arbitre et juge en Suede: Expos6 g6n~ra et rWexions sur la d~localisation des sentences
arbitrales, 1980 Revue de rArbitrage 441, 483-87; Paulsson, The Role of Swedish Courts in
Transnational Arbitration, 21 Va. J. Int'l L. 211, 240-43 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Paul-
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from national jurisdiction; this would clearly be misguided. Indeed,
the international arbitral system would ultimately break down if
the parties could not rely on national jurisdictions to recognize and
enforce awards. The real question is whether international arbitration may be liberated from the local peculiarities of a place of arbitration chosen either by chance or because of its neutrality, and
not because of the parties' attachment to the local rules of
arbitration.
If the international validity of awards depended ineluctably on
their treatment in the hands of local magistrates in their countries
of origin, the goal of establishing a more flexible and universal system of international arbitration would be frustrated. With the parties' attention riveted on the attitude of local courts, their focus
would be on procedural niceties rather than on fairness, convenience, and neutrality. Institutions selecting sites for arbitrations
would inevitably feel constrained to choose those countries where
they had previously conducted proceedings.
Significantly, the situs for an ICC arbitration is selected not on
the basis of the local legal system's relative compatibility with the
ICC Rules of Arbitration, but rather on the factual context of the
case and the domiciles of the parties.2 9 International arbitral mechanisms, such as that of the ICC, aspire to be universal and are
characterized by their flexibility. The parties may name arbitrators
in whom they have confidence without being obliged to choose'
from a narrow list of possibilities. They may represent themselves
in any way they wish, generally using their ordinary legal advisers,
without being forced to call on a local or institutional bar that
alone understands the relevant procedures. Businesses involved in
international commerce value this freedom, and it is reasonable to
assume that they are capable of deciding that they want such an
open mechanism for the resolution of their disputes.
A denationalized award may be accepted by the legal order of an
enforcement jurisdiction although it is independent from the legal
order of its country of origin. A contract signed at the Munich airport between a Japanese consortium and a U.S. subcontractor selected to perform engineering services in the Middle East illustrates this point. Legal consequences may flow from this contract
sson, The Role of Swedish Courts].
29. For a discussion of the situses chosen for ICC arbitrations, see W. Craig, W. Park & J.
Paulsson, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (to be published in 1983).
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because of the importance attributed to it by the legal orders represented by the municipal courts of San Francisco, Tokyo, or
Cairo, depending on a multitude of potentially relevant jurisdictional criteria. The significance of the agreement presumably is not
affected by the fact that it was signed in Germany; it is "independent" of the German legal order.
This feature of international arbitration probably has little impact in practice because counsel will inevitably seek to conform the
process to local rules as a matter of prudence. Sensitivity to the
local law will solve most problems, and in any case the parties and
arbitrators probably will not violate fundamental legal principles
30
or norms.

2. The Practicalityof Denationalization
Conforming an arbitration to the local rules of the situs may
lead to severe practical problems. For example, the local law might
provide that all arbitrators must sign the arbitral award and that
any contractual stipulation to the contrary is invalid. Although the
local rule may be quite reasonable when applied in that jurisdiction, its application to an international arbitration would be unfortunate, especially when the parties presume that international

rules, and not local ones, will apply.
If the award is not recognized in the situs country, however, another nation may arguably recognize the award by holding that
under its law the result of the arbitration is valid, and the effect of
annulment must be limited to the situs country. Nevertheless, no
court has yet held that an award, annulled for a procedural error
under the law of the situs country, may be enforced abroad. It may
still happen that international businessmen may therefore select
an arbitral site based on its convenience, without regard for the
local legal procedures, and find that the ensuing award is unenforceable because of a purely local policy consideration.
The absence of a legal precedent allowing enforcement of such a
30. Over the past decade, the various national legal systems have, whether by judicial
initiative or specific legislation, attenuated the impact of local rules on international arbitration. This may be accomplished in two ways: by declining to apply local rules to an international case, or simply by reforming the entire body of domestic arbitration law so that it
corresponds to generally accepted international norms. With regard to the latter, a notable
development is the current effort by the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law to draft a model law for the consideration of national legislatures. See 16 U.N. L
Rep. 40 (1982).
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"defective" award, however, is hardly surprising. In a majority of
cases, a defect sufficient to render the award challengeable in its
country of origin will also be sufficient to cause the forum of execution to decline recognition.
The frontiers of delocalization may soon be tested in the context
of the U.S.-Iranian Claims Tribunal at The Hague, which was established by an international agreement.3 Many claimants in
those proceedings no doubt thought the losing parties' obligation
to respect awards was not subject to any determination by the
Dutch legal system, whose sole connection with the matter was
that The Hague was chosen as an attractive neutral locale. Nevertheless, one of the initial awards rendered in these proceedings included a dissenting opinion by an Iranian arbitrator who argued
that while the tribunal could record the parties' settlement, it
wrongly "condemned one of the arbitrating parties, declared it obligated to pay claimant . . . a sum of money and requested the
President of the Tribunal to order the escrow agent to make that
payment to claimant," 32 even though the amount was that agreed
to in the settlement. According to the dissenting arbitrator, the tribunal should have eschewed any reference to the manner in which
the award should be enforced. This would require that the parties
apply for a declaration of executory effect by the Dutch courts in
the absence of voluntary compliance. 3
C.

Scope of Application of the Lex Loci Arbitri

A legal system that subjects international arbitration to its judicial control must decide which procedural norms to apply. Judicial
intervention might be limited to ascertaining the award's basic integrity-whether, for example, the arbitrator displayed partiality
or decided matters that the parties did not entrust to his adjudication. On the other hand, the courts also might concern themselves
with the legal merits of the dispute. The appropriate extent of judicial control depends upon whether it is more important that an

31. The tribunal was established by the Algiers Accords. Declaration of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the United States and Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 230.
32. NCR Corp. v. Iran, 1982 Iranian Assets Litigation Rep. (Andrews) 5615 (Nov. 17,
1982) (Kashani, Arbitrator, concurring and dissenting). The decision is to be reprinted in 8
Y.B. Com. Arb. (1983), supra note 17.
33. Id. In early 1983, Iran confirmed that it would indeed use the Dutch courts to request
that they set aside the award. See 1983 Iranian Assets Litigation Rep. (Andrews) 5939 (Jan.
21, 1983).
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arbitral award be correct, or that it be final.
Before 1979, English law had come down on the side of legal
certainty, and attempted to subject all disputes decided within the
borders of England and Wales to a uniform application of legal
principles. 4 Although parties to a business dispute had agreed to
give the responsibility for its resolution to an arbitrator, the arbitral process still could be vitiated whenever one party, fearful of
losing, decided to break its agreement to settle the dispute privately, and to take its chance instead before a judge.3 5 Frequently,
the parties to the arbitration were entangled in complicated judicial proceedings understood only by high-priced Q.C.s.
This tension between legality and finality represents a rivalry
between two types of certainty: one related to the uniform application of legal norms, the other concerned with the adjudicatory forum. The value of a uniform application of legal principles perhaps
is strongest when there is a danger that private dispute resolution
may become a means for the strong to oppress the weak through
unequal bargaining power, or when the interests of third parties
may be affected by the dispute. In such cases, courts arguably may
have a duty to examine the legal substance of the dispute and
other matters that bear on the award's basic integrity, such as arbitrator fraud, partiality, or abuse of authority.
To put it another way, the judiciary need not concern itself with
the correctness of an arbitrator's conclusions merely to ensure a
proper interpretation of the parties' contract. Judicial intervention
in the merits of a dispute voluntarily submitted to arbitration is
required only if an arbitrator's decision may directly implicate national or third-party interests. Intervention may be justified, for
example, if an arbitrator's misinterpretation of an oil supply contract would result in injury to the consumers of the fuel, or when
an arbitrator's interpretation of company law frustrates a national
policy of protecting the integrity of the securities market. If national policies are not affected, courts should limit their role to ensuring that the award is not obtained through violation of fundamental norms of procedural fairness.
A national legal system also may accomodate the needs of international trade and investment by refraining from exercising super-

34. For a discussion of pre-1979 English law 'und proposals to reform it, see infra notes 4875 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 48-61 and accompanyi , text.
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vision over the legal merits of the arbitration. The U.S. Supreme
30
Court adopted such an approach in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
a case involving allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations in the sale
of stock, normally an issue not subject to arbitration in the United
States.3 7 The policy in favor of permitting a neutral private forum
to settle international business disputes outweighed the competing
consideration of protecting investors from fraud in the sale of
securities.3 8

Mobil Oil Indonesia v. Asamera Oil (Indonesia)39 further illustrates the reluctance of U.S. federal courts to set aside arbitral
awards. Following a New York state-court opinion holding that the
arbitrators rather than the courts should decide the applicable procedural rules,4 ° a federal district court declined to vacate the arbi41
tral award under the provisions of the 1925 U.S. Arbitration Act.
Under the parties' agreement, Mobil was to pay royalties on crude
oil; despite the common meaning of this term, the arbitrators in-

36. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).

37. See id. at 509, 512-13.
38. See id. at 515-20.
39. 487 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
40. Mobil Oil Indonesia v. Asamera Oil (Indonesia), 56 A.D.2d 339, 341-42, 392 N.Y.S.2d
614, 616 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 43 N.Y.2d 276, 372 N.E.2d 21, 401
N.Y.S.2d 186 (1977). The New York Appellate Division reasoned that:
The issue at bar is whether the courts or the arbitrators should glean from the
contract the applicable procedural rules ...
That the parties agreed to arbitrate is undisputed as is the fact that the issues
raised on arbitration bear a reasonable relationship to the contract. Furthermore, that the arbitrators' result is rational, although it may not have been the
result others would have reached is beyond peradventure. The parties agreed to
be bound by the Rules of the ICC and it was for the arbitrators to determine
which Rules of the ICC were intended.
56 A.D.2d at 341-42, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 616.
41. 487 F. Supp. at 66-67. The 1925 Arbitration Act provides that a federal district court
may set aside an award rendered within its district on the following grounds:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1976).
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terpreted it to include natural gas and other liquid hydrocarbons
as well. 42 The court nonetheless refused to vacate the award, and
instead found it sufficient that the arbitrators' statement of reasons contained a "barely colorable" justification for the outcome. 3
Judicial control over the substantive legal issues of an international arbitration should be minimal. Parties to the dispute have a
right to the privacy they bargained for. In addition, arbitrators
should be free from the threat of being overruled because of errors
in their analysis, so that reasoned awards will be rendered more
frequently, thereby contributing to the development of a modem
"law merchant.""'
A complete lack of judicial control, however, is undesirable. Even
if the arbitration involves neither citizens nor interests of the forum State, national courts should ensure the integrity of awards
rendered within national borders. Such awards may benefit from
recognition and enforcement under the New York Convention.
Some parties to the Convention, including the United States, limit
its application to awards rendered in the territory of another contracting State.4 5 By allowing an award rendered in its territory to

become binding, a State facilitates its enforcement and thus should
provide a mechanism for challenging the award's procedural
deficiencies.
The legal system of the place of the arbitral proceedings should
correct deficiencies in the award's integrity. Otherwise, the losing
party would be forced to attack an invalid award in each of the
many States where the award might be enforced against its property.46 Simply on grounds of equity, the contesting party should

therefore have an opportunity to expose procedural irregularities
at the place of the arbitration, which will normally have as great a

42. 487 F. Supp. at 65-66.
43. Id. at 66.
44. On the new law merchant, see Goldman, La Lex Mercatoria dans lea contrats et

rarbitrage internationaux realit6 et perspectives, 106 Journal du Droit International 475
(1979).
45. New York Convention, supra note 21, 21 U.S.T. at 2566. The right of contracting
parties to restrict enforcement on the basis of reciprocity is provided in article 1(3) of the
Convention.
46. A.J. van den Berg seems to suggest this problem in his discussion of the applicability
of the Convention to denationalized awards: "[I1f, in a 'de-nationalized' arbitration, serious
procedural violations have been committed, the aggrieved party must have the right to have
such award set aside." A. van den Berg, supra note 9, at 30.
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claim as any other forum to being mutually convenient for the
parties.

II.

ENGLISH ARBITRATION LAW

The recent history of English arbitration law, and in particular
of the 1979 Arbitration Act,' 7 provides the occasion for a more
profound case study of the interaction between judge and arbitra-tor. Like a prism, discussion of these developments serves to separate the themes that inhere in the competing desiderata of justice
and finality in private dispute resolution.
A.

The Special Case Procedure

Before 1979, commercial arbitration in London was subject to
the "special case" or "case stated" procedure by which a party
could compel an arbitrator to submit a point of law to the High

Court. 48 Submission of the legal issue during the proceedings was
called a "consultative case"; the judge would decide the question
and then remit the case to the arbitrator. Submission after the arbitration was called stating a case in the form of "alternate

awards," and the court had to choose between one or the other.
Until the High Court had answered the legal question stated by
the arbitrator, there was no final award in a legal sense, even

47. Arbitration Act, 1979, ch. 42. For the legislative and historical background of the Act,
see 392 Par. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) 89 (1978); 397 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) 434.64 (19781979); 398 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) 529-74, 1465-82 (1979); Commercial Court Committee,
Report on Arbitration, Cmd. No. 7284 (1978); Address by Lord Diplock, The Fourth Alexander Lecture, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, London (Feb. 28, 1978), reprinted in 44
Arb. 107 (1978); Park, Judicial Supervision of Transnational Commercial Arbitration: The
English Arbitration Act of 1979, 21 Harv. Int'l L.J. 87, 87-104 (1980). See generally M. Mus.
till & S. Boyd, The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in England (1982).
48. Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 27, § 21.
The Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., ch. 125, first applied a voluntary
special case procedure to commercial arbitration. Courts were later given power to order a
statement of the case. See Arbitration Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., ch. 49.
Questions of fact were outside the scope of the court's authority, but the line between fact
and law was thin. The courts possessed sufficient discretion to find legal elements in most
issues. See Bunge S.A. v. Kruse, [1977] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 492 (C.A. 1976). In Bunge, the sale of
soybean meal to a Belgian buyer by a German seller was frustrated by the 1973 U.S. grain
export embargo. The Grain and Feed Trade Association's (GAFTA) finding of "accord and
satisfaction" in the settlement agreement was held to be a matter of law, and not fact, on
the case stated by the GAFTA Board of Appeal. Id. at 495.
Statement of the case might prove to be detrimental to the requesting party. See Ismal v.
Polish Ocean Lines, 1976 Q.B. 893, 905, 909 (C.A.).
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though courts in practice might refer to the arbitrator's preference
or informal decision as his award. The uniqueness of English law
lay not in the right to appeal the arbitrator's conclusions on matters of law, but rather in allowing the appeal before formal delivery
of his award. As a result, his decision might be refused enforcement in a country in which the debtor had assets because the
award might not be deemed "binding" under the New York
Convention.4 9
In 1922, when the Court of Appeal held that the supervisory jurisdiction of English courts could not be abrogated by contract,
any escape from judicial review was foreclosed.5 0 The Court of Appeal considered it contrary to English public policy to condone an
'
"erroneous administration of the law."51
The high water mark of judicial intervention came in a 1973
case, Halfdan Grieg & Co. A/S v. Sterling Coal & Navigation
Corp.,52 frequently called the Lysland for the ship involved. The
Court of Appeal reasoned that agreements to arbitrate disputes in
London were made under the assumption that legal issues could be
referred to judicial determination. 3 Lord Denning ordered the case
stated over the arbitrator's objection, and set forth a tripartite test
for determining when a court should force arbitrators to state a
special case in the future.5 ' The point of law concerned should be:
real and substantial and such as to be open to serious
argument and appropriate for decision by a court of law
• . . clear cut and capable of being accurately stated as
a point of law ....
. . . [and] of such importance that the resolution of it

49. See New York Convention, supra note 21, art. V(1)(e). The Convention does not make
clear whether an award is "binding" before appellate review has taken place. In General
Nat'l Maritime Transp. Co. v. Gotaverken, Judgment of Aug. 13, 1979, Sup. Ct., Swed. (slip

op.), the court held that a pending challenge to the award in France did not constitute a
ground for refusing to enforce the award in Sweden. See Paulsson, The Role of Swedish
Courts, supra note 28, at 236-40. For a translation of the Swedish decision, see id. at 244-48.
For a discussion of Gotaverken in France, see infra notes 15-16 and ,companying text.

50. Czarnikow & Co. v. Roth, Schmidt & Co., [1922] 2 K.B. 478 (CA.).
51. Id. at 489. Referring to a part of London near Fleet Street that had been a sanctuary
for criminals, Lord Justice Scrutton declared that "[tihere must be no Alsatia in England
where the King's writ does not run." Id. at 488.
52. [1973] 1 Q.B. 843 (CA.).
53. Id. at 862.
54. Id. at 861-63.
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is necessary for the proper determination of the case
55

Thereafter, arbitrators apparently feared that denial of an application made by a party to state a case, apart from the most frivolous
requests, could be considered arbitrator "misconduct," a basis for
setting aside an award."8
One result of the special case procedure was that it prevented an
arbitrator in England from making such decisions according to his
own concept of equity and fairness 57 as an amiable compositeur.5
The arbitrator was required to apply a "fixed and recognizable system of law."59
B.

The Call for Reform

Scholars, legislators, and judges criticized the case-stated procedure for allowing parties who feared they were about to lose an
arbitration to delay enforcement of an award. 60 Under the procedure, the arbitrator was required to prepare the consultative questions; the High Court had to hold a hearing that might involve full
argument; and appeal might be taken to the Court of Appeal, and

thence to the House of Lords. Meanwhile, by virtue of the delay,
the undeserving party received the equivalent of an interest-free
loan in the amount of the unpaid award."'
Lord Diplock's 1978 Alexander Lecture to the Institute of Arbitrators lamented the use of the case-stated procedure for delay.62
Five months later, a Commercial Court Committee, 3 chaired by
55. Id. at 861-62.
56. See Commercial Court Committee, supra note 47, at 6.
57. See Schmitthof, The Supervisory Jurisdiction of English Courts, in International Ar.
bitration: Liber Amicorum for Martin Domke 289, 298 (P. Sanders ed. 1967).
58. On amiable composition, see generally E. Loquin, L'amiable composition en droit
compar6 et international (1980).
59. Orion Compania Espanola de Seguros v. Belfort Maatschappij Voor Algemene
Verzekgringeen, [1962] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 257, 264.
60. See 392 Parl. Deb., supra note 47, at 91 (remarks of Lord Hacking); 397 Parl. Deb.,
supra note 47, at 437 (remarks of Lord Elwyn-Jones, Lord Chancellor); Commercial Court
Committee, supra note 47, at 8; Diplock, supra note 47, 44 Arb. at 109-10.
61. For examples of the types of cases stated, see Park, supra note 47, at 95, 125-27
(1980).
62. Diplock, supra note 47, 44 Arb. at 109-10.
63. The Administration of Justice Act, 1970, ch. 31, § 3, established the Commercial
Court and recognized a practice inaugurated in 1895 by resolution of the Queen's Bench
Division of the High Court whereby cases on a "commercial list" were assigned to High
Court judges with special expertise in commercial matters.
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then High Court Justice John Donaldson, recommended the abolition of the special case procedure.8 4 The Commercial Court Committee also urged the abolition of another High Court procedure-the power to set aside an award for "error of law on its
face.""5 This procedure had made arbitrators hesitant to deliver
reasoned awards for fear they would be quashed. 8
The Committee proposed a more restricted review procedure.
Awards would be final when rendered, and the right of appeal to
the High Court would be limited to legal questions that might substantially affect the rights of the parties. The Court was to be
given the power to impose conditions, such as a deposit, on the
right to appeal, in order to reduce frivolous appeals. A procedure
that roughly approximated the old "consultative case" would continue, but only when* it would save the parties a considerable
amount of money. 7 Moreover, the Committee recommended that
the right to appeal from the High Court to the Court of Appeal be
limited to questions of general importance to the particular
industry."8
The Committee also considered what it called the "entrenchment" of judicial review-in other words, the prohibition of contractual exclusion of court supervision.

The Committee identified

four kinds of arbitration: domestic disputes, in which both parties
were British and the contract was governed by British law;70 inter-

national disputes, in which at least one party was foreign; disputes
governed by foreign law; and the so-called "special category dis-

64. In 1977 a Commercial Court Committee was created to link the users of the Court and
the Court itself. Committee members include representatives of London's merchants, bankers, and arbitrators, as well as the six Commercial Court judges who serve ex officio.
65. See Commercial Court Committee, supra note 47, at 5, 8-9; see also Arbitration Act,
1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 27, § 22.
66. See Commercial Court Committee, supra note 47, at 8-9.
67. Id. at 9-10.
68. Id. at 10.
69. For a discussion of the traditional English view Qf entrenchment, see Czarnikow & Co.
v. Roth, Schmidt & Co., [1922] 2 K.B. 478 (C.).
70. All United Kingdom residents-including those in Scotland and Northern Ireland-were included, although the Act applies only to arbitrations conducted in England
and Wales. See Arbitration Act, 1979, ch. 42, §§ 3(6)-(7), 8(4). Entrenchment of review for
domestic contracts, which the Committee favored retaining, rests on a concern for parties
with limited bargaining power or sophistication. As a preventive rule, it is intended to prevent the unwilling renunciation of recourse to the courts because of a stronger party's threat
of refusal to deal with a weaker party who did not want arbitration. See Commercial Court
Committee, supra note 47, at 12. The 1979 Act followed this approach. See Arbitration Act,
1979, § 3(6).
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putes," arising out of insurance, maritime, and commodities contracts. The Committee recommended that parties always have the
right to exclude judicial review after a dispute has arisen, but that
contractual exclusion of judicial review of future disputes be permitted only for international contracts and contracts governed by
foreign law."' For the latter, exclusion would be automatic, and
also rather academic, since proof of foreign law is treated in England not as a legal issue, but as proof of a fact and not subject to
7 2'
judicial review.
Because English law arguably had been the world's pre-eminent
and preferred law for disputes arising from maritime, insurance
and commodities agreements, the Committee believed that judicial
review would foster the continued legal development of these
areas.
Finally, the Committee recommended a cosmetic change in the
term "misconduct," for which an arbitrator might be removed, or
his award set aside. 3 Such an opprobrious term was considered objectionable to describe procedural errors . The Committee did not
favor abolition of the High Court's right to remove an arbitrator or
set aside an award for such errors, but merely found the terminplogy offensive.74
The Committee did not recommend curtailment of the High
Court's general right to remit awards to the arbitrators.7 5 This is
surprising in light of the design of the Act. The power to send an
award back to the arbitrator can be a weapon for judicial intervention as formidable as the power to force the arbitrator to state a
case.
Eight months after the Committee's Report, Parliament enacted
the Arbitration Act of 1979, which became effective for all arbitrations commencing after July 31 of that year.7 0 Parliament ap-

71. See Commercial Court Committee, supra note 47, at 10-12, 13-14.
72. See A. Dicey, Conflict of Laws 1124-33 (J.Morris 9th ed. 1973) (citing Ottoman Bank
v. Chakarian, 1938 A.C. 260, 279 (P.C.)).
73. See Commercial Court Committee, supra note 47, at 17. See also Arbitration Act,
1950, § 23.

74. Commercial Court Committee, supra note 47, at 17.
75. Arbitration Act, 1950, § 22.
76. Arbitration Act, 1979, ch. 42. Parties to an arbitration commencing before August 1,
1979, may agree in writing that the provisions of the Act shall apply to an arbitration already in force.
The Act modifies, but does not supersede, the Arbitration Act of 1950. The Bill originally
had been introduced into the House of Lords, where extensive debate went on during late
1978 and early 1979. Following announcement of the May General Election, the Bill was
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peared motivated by commercial as well as legal concerns, since
many viewed the Act as a means by which to increase London's
importance as a situs for international arbitration. 7" During the
Parliamentary debates, Lord Hacking noted that parties to international contracts were discouraged from choosing London as the
situs for arbitration because of the case-stated procedure. 78 Lord
Cullen of Ashborne estimated that a new arbitration law might attract to England as much as £500 million per year in "invisible
exports" in the form of fees for arbitrators, barristers, solicitors,
and expert witnesses.79
Parliament particularly wanted parties to use London more extensively as a situs for the resolution of so-called "supra-national"
disputes, especially those arising from contracts entered into by
governments of developing nations for public works, or for the exploitation of natural resources.8 0 Developing nations are particularly sensitive to the publicity, and to the perceived affront to their
sovereignty, in submitting their disputes to the courts of another
country. Although there is no consensus as to whether arbitration
involving a sovereign State may be removed from the control of
the lex loci arbitri,1 a more autonomous arbitral process presuma-

bly would be an attractive alternative to litigation before foreign
courts. But because of the hostility to arbitration of a number of
Third World nations,82 particularly those in Latin America, 83 the
rushed through the House of Commons on the night of April 2, and received Royal Assent
on April 4, 1979.
77. Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran, a patent barrister, declared that "the main object of this Bill
is to attract arbitration to London." 398 Parl. Deb., supra note 47, at 536. See also the
remarks of the Lord Chancellor in 397 ParL Deb., supra note 47, at 441: "It is important
that the City of London ... not be hampered in the maintenance and expansion of [its]
important and historical role in arbitration matters."
78. 392 ParL Deb., supra note 47, at 89-95.
79. 392 Parl. Deb., supra note 47, at 99.
80. See 392 ParL Deb., supra note 47, at 89 (remarks of Lord Hacking); Diplock, supra
note 47, at 112; Commercial Court Committee, supra note 47, at 12.
81. Compare the award in BP Exploration Co. (Libya) v. Libya, 53 LLI.R 297, 308-11
(1979) (award rendered under national law of place of arbitration), with the awards in Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya, 53 LL.R. 389, 431-36 (1979), and Saudi Arabia v.
Arabian American Oil Co., 27 LL.R. 117, 153-56 (1963) (arbitrators held that jurisdictional
immunity of State precludes subjecting proceeding to lex loci arbitn).
82. The governments of many developing nations, particularly those of Latin America
and the OPEC countries, have manifested some mistrust of arbitration taking place outside
their borders. See generally Delvolv6, Arbitration and Public Policy in Developing Countries, in Arbitration and the Licensing Process 6-103 (R. Goldscheider & M. de Hass eds.
1981); McLaughlin, Arbitration and Developing Countries, 13 Int'l Law. 211, 211-21 (1979).
The "Group of 77" at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
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extent to which the Act will have this effect is questionable.
C.

The 1979 English Arbitration Act

In large part implementing the recommendations of the Commercial Court Committee, the 1979 Act abolished the special case,
along with the common law jurisdiction of the High Court to set
aside or remit an arbitral award for error of law on its face; s ' it
replaced these procedures with a more limited right of appeal to

(UNCTAD) articulated its aversion to arbitration in article 2(2)(c) of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which provides that controversies arising out of nationalization of foreign property shall be settled by tribunals of the nationalizing State. G.A. Res.
3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doec. A/9559 (1974). See generally Park,
Legal Issues in the Third World's Economic Development (Book Review), 61 B.U.L. Rev.
1321, 1326-30 (1981). The UNCTAD Draft Code of Conduct on Technology Transfer, as
initially drafted by the Group of 77, contained similar language. UNCTAD Draft Code of
Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, May 6, 1980, app. D., U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/
25 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 773, 807 (1980).
On the other hand, African nations appear to have a more positive view of arbitration. See
Tiewul & Tsegah, Arbitration and the Settlement of Commercial Disputes: A Selective Survey of African Practice, 24 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 393 (1975). Moreover, in recent years, the
number of arbitrations initiated by Third World parties has increased greatly, and Third
World claimants have had considerable success. See Paulsson, Le Tiers Monde dans
l'arbitrage commercial international, 1983 Revue de l'Arbitrage No. 1 (to be published).
83. The so-called "Calvo Doctrine," intended as a Latin American antidote to abuses of
international arbitration, requires that foreigners submit disputes arising out of government
contracts to resolution by local courts. This doctrine arose at a time when the United States
and the Western European nations were perceived as exploiting weaker trading partners
that were unable to meet their international financial obligations. Intervention by industrialized nations on behalf of their nationals frequently resulted in arbitration that was viewed
as partial to the economically dominant countries. Carlos Calve urged Latin American governments to avoid foreign diplomatic intervention by requiring foreign companies to agree
to adjudication within the host State of any dispute arising out of an investment contract.
Under such an agreement, an alien waives the right to diplomatic intervention by his government, thereby cutting off international arbitration. D. Shen, The Calvo Clause 5-6, 9-21
(1955).
The constitutions of a number of Latin American States, Wesley, The Procedural Malaise
of Foreign Investment Disputes in Latin America: From Local Tribunals to Factfinding, 7
Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 813, 820-24 (1975), as well as the Andean Common Market, Andean
Foreign Investment Code art. 51, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 138, 153 (1977), have prohibited
foreign arbitration of state contracts. Latin American countries generally have not ratified
the New York Convention. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General,
supra note 21, at 611, and 7 Y.B. Com. Arb., supra note 17, at 288-89. A number of Latin
American States have, however, ratified the Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, adopted Jan. 30, 1975, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 3. See Comment, The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration, 75 Am. J. Int'l L. 982 (1981).
84. Arbitration Act, 1979, § 1(1).
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the High Court.8 5 Awards are now final and enforceable immediately, even if appeal is possible later. Appeal may be made only
with the consent of the opposing party 6 or with leave of the
court,8 7 which will not be granted unless determination of the legal
question "could substantially affect the rights of one or more of
the parties." 88 The court has discretion to attach conditions to its
leave to appeal; for example, it may require security for enforcement of the award. 89 The High Court decision may be taken to the
Court of Appeal only if the High Court has certified that the matter is of "general public importance" or for some other "special
90
reason."
In addition, the High Court may order an arbitrator
to state the
9
1
reasons for his decision if a party so requests before the decision,
or if there are "special reasons" why such a request was not
made. 92 A question of law arising during the proceedings can be
referred to the Court for interlocutory clarification in a manner
similar to the old consultative case at the request of the arbitrator
or of all the parties.9"
The Act's most significant provision for international arbitration
is its authorization of "exclusion agreements,"" which strip the
High Court of some of its supervisory functions, but not of its powers to remit an award to the arbitrator 5 or to set aside an award
for arbitrator "misconduct."9 Agreement to exclude judicial intervention may always be made once arbitration has begun. Parties to
international agreements have the additional right to contract out
of judicial review of future disputes by a clause in the principal
contract itself.9 7 In what the Act calls "non-domestic" contracts, 8
parties may agree in writing to preclude the courts from hearing

85. Id. § 1(2).
86. Id. § 1(3)(a).

87. Id. § 1(3)(b).
88. Id. § 1(4).
89. Id. § 1(4). See, e.g., Mondial Trading Co. G.mLb.- v. Gill & Duffus Zuckerhandelsgesellschaft mnb.H., [1980] 2 loyd's L.& 376, 380 (Q.B.).
90. Arbitration Act, 1979, § 1(7).
91. Id. § 1(5).
92. Id. § 1(6). These "special reasons" are not defined by the Act.
93. Id. § 2(1).
94. Id. § 3.
95. See Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 27, § 22(1).
96. Id. § 23(2).
97. Arbitration Act, 1979, § 3(6).

98. Id. § 3(6)-(7).
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appeals,99 requiring reasoned awards, 10 0 or providing interlocutory
clarification of questions of law.10 1 All of these procedures are still
open to the parties through joint action,1 0 2 but cannot be required
where one of the parties resists and a valid exclusion agreement is
in force.103
The Act expressly makes exclusion agreements effective as a bar
to court intervention in "non-domestic" cases when there are allegations of fraud between the parties. 0 Absent such an agreement,
the High Court would be able to stay these arbitrations'0 5 in order
to give criminal courts the opportunity to deal with the fraud.1 0 0
Application of exclusion agreements prevents a party from hindering the arbitration by an allegation of fraud.
Dishonesty or corruption on the part of an arbitrator, of course,
remains within the courts' jurisdiction. Courts may deal with arbitrator misconduct by setting aside the award,0 7 remitting the
award for reconsideration,10 8 or revoking the authority of the arbitrator.1 0 9 Moreover, the Act expressly limits the right to oust the
courts' jurisdiction to specified areas. 110 Thus, English judges
mIght exercise their former interventionist habits by breathing new
life into residual powers under the 1950 Arbitration Act. The prevailing judicial attitude thus may be more important than the text
of the statute.
Exclusion agreements are intended for what Lord Diplock referred to as "one-off" contracts, that is, agreements negotiated on
an ad hoc basis for a single transaction.'
The "one-off" contract

99. Id. § 3(1)(a).
100. Id. § 3(1)(b).
101. Id. § 3(1)(c).
102. Id. §§ 1(3)(a), 1(5)(a), 2(1)(b). These sections are unaffected by exclusion
agreements.
103. The validity of the exclusion agreement will depend on whether the contract is "domestic" or "non-domestic." Id. § 3(6).

104. Id. § 3(3).
105. Arbitration Act, 1950, § 24(2).
106. On inter-party fraud, see R. Gibson-Jarvie & G. Hawker, A Guide to Commercial
Arbitration Under the 1979 Act 28-29 (1980).
107. See Arbitration Act, 1950, § 23(2).
108. Id. § 22.
109. Id. § 23(1). For a description of the ways in which English judges deal with prejudice
by the arbitrator, see Shenton, Arbitral Impartiality: The Attitude of the English Courts, 8
Int'l Bus. Law. 76 (1980).
110. Arbitration Act, 1979, § 3(4).
111. See the Lord Chancellor's statements in 397 Parl. Deb., supra note 47, at 438-39;
Commercial Court Committee, supra note 47, at 11-12. The term "one-off" was used by
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presumably is negotiated at arm's length by parties with relatively

equal bargaining power, making it unnecessary to provide a nonwaivable right of judicial review to protect the weak or unsophisticated against unconscionable demands for relinquishment of their
legal rights.
The pre-arbitration exclusion agreement is possible only for international, or "non-domestic," arbitrations.112 Compared to the
French concept of an international arbitration, the English definition of a non-domestic agreement appears mechanical. The English
inquiry confines itself to the parties' residence and nationality.
The more sophisticated Gallic approach, however, considers the economic character of the entire controverted transaction. The 1981
French Arbitration Decree 113 defines an international arbitration
as one that "implicates international commercial interests"114 and
permits the courts to decide what this means. 5 The U.S. notion of
an international arbitral agreement or award falls somewhere between the French and English concepts. The U.S. statute implementing the New York Convention excludes from the Convention's
coverage an agreement or award arising out of a relationship entirely between U.S. citizens, but the statute includes within its
scope commercial relationships between them if the contract involves foreign property, requires performance abroad, or has a reasonable relationship with a foreign country."

Lord Diplock in the Alexander Lecture, supra note 47, at 112, to refer to an agreement
negotiated ad hoe, as opposed to a standard form agreement.
112. An international arbitration agreement is defined in the negative as one that is not
"domestic." A "domestic" agreement is also defined in negative terms as an agreement to
which neither
(a) an individual who is a national of, or habifually resident in, any
State other than the United Kingdom, nor
(b) a body corporate which is incorporated in, or whose central management and control is exercised in, any State other than the United
Kingdom,
is a party at the time the arbitration agreement is entered into.
Arbitration Act, 1979, § 3(7). An arbitration is thus non-domestic if at least one of the
parties, or the situs of the proceedings, is foreign. An arbitration agreement, however, might
be domestic even ff the contract is governed by foreign law.
113. Decree No. 81-500, May 12, 1981, 1981 J.O. 1380, 1981 DS.L. 222.
114. Id. art. 1492, 1981 J.O. at 1402, 1981 D.S.L. at 240.
115. The concept of international arbitration that evolved in French case law before the
1981 decree includes considerations such as execution and performance of the contract and
the residence and nationality of the parties. See Delaume, What Is an International Contract? An American and a Gallic Dilemma, 28 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 258 (1979).
116. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1976).
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Under the 1979 English Act, pre-dispute exclusion agreements
are void as to the so-called "special category" contracts identified
by the Commercial Court Committee. in the areas of shipping,117
insurance,1 18 and commodities. 1"9 Special category international
contracts may include pre-dispute exclusion agreements only if
governed by foreign law, 120 which is normally considered a factual
issue anyway, 12 ' and thus not subject to judicial review. This concept of a "foreign" agreement relates to the proper law of the contract rather than to the parties' residence or nationality.
A Dutch commentator, who considers himself a consumer of
commodity arbitration services in London, has sharply criticized
the general prohibition of exclusion agreements pertaining to disputes over commodity contracts:
[T]he members of a trade should know what is to be
their trading rule, which may differ from one trade to another. And I do not see why such decisions should not be
left to the trade and its arbitrators. At least I can see no
public importance in uniformity in this respect. Moreover, uniformity is not guaranteed, because if a particular
trade would not be pleased by decisions of the courts it
will, in most places, be free to explicitly provide other1 22
wise in its contracts.
In Hong Kong, the 1982 reform to eliminate the use of the casestated approach did indeed go further than the 1979 English Act,
extending the right to enter into pre-dispute exclusion agreements
23
to "special category" disputes.
The 1979 Act is silent on incorporation of exclusion agreements
by reference to institutional arbitration rules. Thus, the effect of a
reference to the ICC Arbitration Rules is problematic. Article 24(2)
of the Rules provides that "[b]y submitting the dispute to arbitra-

117. Arbitration Act, 1979, § 4(1)(a).
118.
119.
120.
121.
merely

Id. § 4(1)(b).
Id. § 4(1)(c).
Id. § 4(1)(ii).
See supra note 72 and accompanying text. Section 4(1)(ii) of the 1979 Act thus seems
cosmetic, perhaps the result of a fear that outsiders would not understand English

law.

122. van Delden, English Commodity Arbitration: A Foreigner Looking Around in
London, in The Art of Arbitration 95, 101 (1982).
123. Leung, The Arbitration (Amendment) Ordinance (1982) of Hong Kong, 48 Arb. 92,
94 (1982).
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tion by the International Chamber of Commerce, the parties shall
be deemed to have undertaken to carry out the resulting award
without delay and to have waived their right to any form of appeal
insofar as such waiver can validly be made." 12 ' Although the intent
is clear, the language does not fit neatly into the terms of section 3
of the 1979 Act. While Mr. Justice Kerr has taken the view that

reference to the ICC Rules should be sufficient for the purposes of
establishing an exclusion agreement under the 1979 Act, 12 5 the
London Court of Arbitration suggests in the preface to its International Arbitration Rules that parties wishing to exclude judicial review should explicitly "agree to exclude any right of application or
appeal to the English Courts in connexion with any question of law
arising in6 the course of the arbitration or with respect to any award
made.",12

In an opinion rendered in the first case to reach the House of
Lords under the 1979 Act,1 27 Lord Diplock stated that prohibition

on pre-dispute exclusion of judicial review of special category disputes was intended to encourage the fertilization of English law by
the commercial community through judicially reviewable arbitrations. In his words, it was:
to facilitate the continued performance by the courts of
their useful function of preserving, in the light of changes
in technology and commercial practices adopted in various trades, the comprehensiveness and certainty of English law as to the legal obligations assumed by the parties to commercial contracts of the classes listed,
2
particularly those expressed in standard terms ....
The benefits of English lex loci arbitri include the power of the
High Court to compel obedience to interlocutory orders, as well as
to empower arbitrators to do so. This assistance may not be abrogated by an exclusion agreement. The High Court or the arbitrator
may order the examination of witnesses, enforce
discovery of docu1 29
ments, or extend the time for filing a claim.

124. 1975 ICC Rules, supra note 25, at 45.
125. Kerr, The Arbitration Act 1979, 43 Mod. L. Rev. 45, 53-54 (1980).
126. London Court of Arbitration, International Arbitration Rules (preface 1981).
127. Pioneer Shipping v. B.T.P. Tioxide Ltd., 1982 A.C. 724 (1981).
128. Id. at 741.
129. See Arbitration Act, 1979, § 5; Arbitration Act, 1950, §§ 12, 13. For a recent example,
see Consolidated Inv. & Contracting Co. v. Saponaria Shipping Co., [19781 1 W..R. 986,
993 (C.A.) (cargo owners soothed into inactivity by shipowner's insurers allowed an exten-
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D.

Judicial Attitudes Toward ArbitratorAutonomy

The text of the 1979 statute may be less important than the content of its application. Old habits die hard; in one recent case,
Lord Denning argued that an award should be remitted to an arbitrator who had not understood that "the strict rules of the common law courts [concerning interest on late demurrage]

. . .

do not

govern the practice of arbitrators." 130 The contradiction startles: a
local judge tries to intervene in an arbitration to force its detachment from local procedure.
Two recent decisions of the House of Lords, however, indicate a
developing judicial respect for arbitral autonomy. In Bremer
Vulkan Schiffbau Und Maschinenfabrik v. South India Shipping
Corp.,1 31 a dispute arose over several vessels built by a German
shipyard for an Indian shipowner."3 2 The 1979 Act did not apply in
Bremer Vulkan since the arbitration began before August 1, 1979,
the effective date of the Act. Nevertheless, the approach of the
House of Lords in Bremer Vulkan comports with the laissez-faire
spirit of the Act.
In Bremer Vulkan, West German law applied to the merits, but
the parties submitted the dispute, which involved alleged defects
in the vessels' construction, to a London arbitrator. 33 Five years
after the arbitrator's appointment, the German shipyard finally requested-and was granted-an injunction against further arbitral
proceedings, on the ground that the Indian shipowner's dilatory
conduct had made it impossible to marshall evidence for a proper
hearing.134 In affirming the injunction, the Court of Appeal construed the arbitration agreement to contain an implied covenant to
proceed with dispatch, and deemed the High Court to have inherent power to restrain arbitration where the claimant's delay was
such as would have allowed dismissal of an action at law for "want
5
of prosecution.

'13

sion of time to commence the arbitration).
130. Tehno-Impex v. Gebr van Weelde Scheepvartkantoor BV, [1981] 2 W.L.R. 821, 832
(C.A.) (dissenting opinion). The arbitrator held that he was without jurisdiction to consider
the issue. Lord Denning took issue with this finding and argued that he was not bound by
the common law. Id. at 827, 832, 846-47.
131. 1981 A.C. 909.
132. Id. at 925.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 928-33.
135. [1980] 2 W.L.R. 905, 916-17, 931-34 (C.A.).
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In a three-to-two decision, the House of Lords held that delay
was an issue for the arbitrator, not a judge.3 8 The High Court thus
lacked the authority to restrain the proceedings. Ironically, arbitral
autonomy was protected in an instance in which the High Court
was attempting to prevent the parties from dragging their feet, one
of the most common complaints voiced about international commercial arbitration.
In his opinion for the majority, Lord Diplock was careful to distinguish the High Court's limited powers in a private consensual
arbitration from its possibly more extensive powers in reviewing
arbitration conducted pursuant to statute.1 37 This distinction is
significant, because of the predisposition of English judges to intervene in statutory arbitral proceedings under the guise of correcting
excess of authority despite an express Parliamentary prohibition of
judicial review.138 One authority also has emphasized the less extensive judicial power to review consensual as opposed to statutory
arbitrations. 139
Pioneer Shipping v. B.T.P. Tioxide Ltd., 40 the first case under
the 1979 Act to reach the House of Lords, involved the Nema, a
vessel chartered for seven voyages. Strikes in Quebec prevented
loading after the first trip, and the shipowner asked to cancel the
charter and to take possession of the vessel. 14 ' Agreeing with the
owner, the arbitrator found that the charter party and its several
addenda had been "frustrated"; the dissatisfied charterer then appealed under the new review procedure.

42

The High Court found

the charter party was not frustrated and ordered the Nema to return to Canada to pick up another load. 143 The matter then went
to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, both of which held
that the arbitrator's conclusion should have been accepted-even
though, as Lord Denning put it, "in strict law the Nema should
136. 1981 A.C. at 986.
137. Id. at 977-79.
138. For a discussion of arbitrator excess of authority, see infra notes 152-79 and acccompanying text.
139. See Donaldson, Judicial Review of Awards (Arbitration Act 1979), 1981 Forum
London Proc. 47, 52 (Int'l Bar Ass'n Sec. Bus. L. sponsor).
140. 1982 A.C. 724 (1981). The guidelines for granting leave to appeal set forth by Lord
Diplock in this case have been considered recently in Italnare Shipping Co. v. Ocean

Tanker Co., [1982] 1 W.L.R. 158 (C.A.), and in B.V.S. v. Kerman Shipping, [1982] 1 W.L.R.
166 (Q.B.).
141. The Nema, 1980 Q.B. 547, 560 (C.A.).
142. Id. at 563-64.
143. Id. at 551, 566-67.
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have waited [in Quebec]-queuing up there-until the strike ended. ' 144 According to Lord Denning, the arbitrator's decision
should be disturbed only if it is one "such that no reasonable arbitrator could reach," or the arbitrator "misdirected himself in point
of law. '145 The arbitrator must have looked to the wrong legal
standard and not merely misapplied appropriate principles.
In the Nema decision, Lord Diplock examined the 1979 Act's
legislative history, and in particular its preoccupation with
London's attractiveness as a situs for the resolution of disputes
arising from the "one-off" contract.1 4 6 He stressed the Parliamentary intent to accord laissez-faire treatment to "one-off" contracts,
and said that review should be granted only when it appears "upon
a mere perusal of the reasoned award itself without the benefit of
adversarial argument, that the meaning ascribed to the clause by
the arbitrator is obviously wrong . . . [and that] there was [not]
more than one possible view as to [its] meaning. 1 147 Lord Diplock
further remarked that "to exemplify what is meant by the convenient neologism 'a one-off case' it would be hard to find a better
exemplar [than the Nema case]. 1 48 Surprisingly, the charter party
for the Nema was on a standard form. The clause to be construed
was "one-off," however, because it was negotiated149to amend a contract for a single voyage to accommodate seven.
The 1979 statute circumscribes the High Court's discretion to
grant non-consensual leave to appeal from an arbitrator's award to
questions of law that "could substantially affect the rights of one
or more of the parties" to the arbitration.1 50 According to Lord
Denning, this means it must be "a point of practical importance-not an academic point."1 511 He did not say how judges
should distinguish "practical" from "academic" legal issues-if
such can be done. Presumably, this would require a de minimis
amount to be set, depending on the controversy. For example, a
legal question affecting £1000 might be purely academic in a dispute involving £1,000,000.
144. Id. at 561.
145. Id. at 566.
146. 1982 A.C. at 734-43. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
147. Id. at 742-43.
148. Id. at 735. Lord Diplock stated: "If ever there were a case which. . . ought never to
have been allowed to get any further than the arbitrator's award, this was one." Id. at 734.
149. Id. at 746 (Roskill, L.J.).
150. Arbitration Act, 1979, ch. 27, § 1(4).
151. 1980 Q.B. at 564.
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E. Excess of Authority

The distinction between the judge who corrects fundamental
procedural unfairness, and the judge who imposes his own conclusions on the merits of the dispute, stubbornly resists intellectually
satisfactory articulation. As mentioned above, the 1979 Act did not
repeal the High Court's statutory power to remit awards for reconsideration by the arbitrator ' 52 and to set aside an award for arbitrator "misconduct. '

15

According to the Commercial Court Com-

mittee, the term "misconduct" covers "procedural errors and
omissions by arbitrators who are doing their best to uphold the
highest standards of their profession."'"
One type of "misconduct" is the rendering of an award in excess
of the arbitrator's authority. Commercial arbitration is a consensual process, and thus an arbitrator has only the power granted
him by the parties.155 An award that exceeds the arbitrator's authority may be no different than one rendered in the absence of a
valid arbitration agreement as to the controverted issue. Two
merchants may agree that an arbitrator will settle disputes arising
out of the sale of apples, but they have not thereby accepted arbitration for a-later contract to sell walnuts. If the arbitration agreement vaguely refers to sales of "fruit," however, the proper scope
of the arbitration will depend on whether "fruit" includes only apples, or whether the word is used in its botanical sense to include
the contents of any seed plant's developed ovary, including
walnuts.
Judges in other countries have had to struggle with the thin line
between error of law and excess of authority.15'6 English courts
before 1979 paid less attention to this difficult issue in the context
of commercial arbitration, since all questions of law could be reviewed by the special case procedure.
Lord Denning has stated that "whenever a tribunal goes wrong
in law, it goes outside the jurisdiction conferred on it and its decision is void."'' 57 Thus, the future of commercial arbitration in Eng-

land may depend on how English judges face the elusive distinc152. Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 27, § 22.
153. Id. § 23.
154. Commercial Court Committee, supra note 47, at 17.
155. For a general discussion of excess of authority, see IV.Reisman, Nullity and Revision
(1971).
156. See Park, supra note 47, at 101.
157. A. Denning, The Discipline of the Law 74 (1979).
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tion between an error of law, which may be removed from judicial
scrutiny, and arbitrator excess of authority, which presumably may
not be removed from review.
As an illustration, assume that a license provides for the pay-

ment of royalties on the first of the year, that in the event of default the licensor may revoke the license, and that the license in
fact is cancelled for late payment. Assume further that the cancellation gives rise to an arbitration, and that the licensor is found
liable for wrongful termination of the license. If no justification for
the late royalty payment exists under the applicable law, the arbitrator has interpreted the contract erroneously. It is equally arguable, however, that the arbitrator has done more: he has modified
the contract's payment date. Unless the submission agreement
gave the arbitrator this power,'58 he has acted improperly. It remains to be seen whether High Court judges Will use the power to
remit an award' 59 or the catch-all prohibition of arbitrator "misconduct"160 to review such an award because the arbitrator exceeded his authority.
Two cases lead one to wonder whether English judges may ignore exclusion agreements, just as they have ignored unequivocal
Parliamentary prohibitions on review of statutory arbitration and
lower court decisions. These so-called "ouster clauses" have been
vitiated under the court's view that error of law constituted excess
of authority.
One ouster clause received short shrift by the House of Lords in
Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission,"6 ' a case involving a compensation claim for manganese mines lost during the
1956 Suez crisis. Proof that the claimant and any successors in title
were British nationals was a prerequisite for compensation, and
the Foreign Compensation Commission found that the plaintiffs
failed to satisfy this requirement. 6 2 The relevant statute stated
that "[t]he determination by the [Foreign Compensation] Commission of any application made to them . . . shall not be called in
question in any court of law.'1 6 3 Despite this clear statutory prohi-

158. For example, the arbitrator may have been given the power of amiable composition.
See supra text accompanying note 58.
159. Arbitration Act, 1950, § 22.

160. Id. § 23.
161. [1969] 2 A.C. 147.

162. Id. at 201-05.
163. Foreign Compensation Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 12, § 4(4).
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bition on judicial review of the Commission's decisions, the House
of Lords reversed the Commission. Lord Pearce declared the Commission's decision a nullity, saying that "[w]hile engaged on a
proper inquiry, the tribunal .
may ask itself the wrong questions; or it may take into account matters which it was not directed
to take into account. Thereby it would step outside its jurisdiction
[and] would cause its purported decision to be a nullity."'I
In PearIman v. Keepers & Governors of Harrow School,165 Lord
Denning refused to give effect to an ouster clause providing that
"no judgment [of the county courts] shall be removed by appeal,
motion, certiorari or otherwise into any other court whatever."' 68
In this case, a tenant had sought the right to purchase his house
under the Leasehold Reform Act of 1967.167 The right to purchase
existed only for dwellings with a taxable value falling below a statutory ceiling, which could be increased to take into account "structural alterations" made by the tenant.16 The tenant in question
claimed that a new central heating system was just such an alteration, and thus raised the value ceiling. 69 The county court, however, disagreed.17 0 The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the
erroneous determination about the heating system was also an error as to the lower court's jurisdiction.1 7 1 Lord Denning gave the
following explanation:
[T]he distinction between an error which entails absence
of jurisdiction-and an error made within the jursidiction-is very fine. So fine indeed that it is rapidly being
eroded .... By holding that [the heating system] was
not a 'structural alteration . . . or addition' [the judge]

deprived himself of jurisdiction to determine [other]
matters.'
These two cases must be considered with great caution, since they
dealt with the review of statutory arbitration and lower court decisions, which admittedly rest on a different foundation than review
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

[1969] 2 A.C. at 195.
[1978] 3 W.L.R. 736 (C.A.).
County Courts Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 22, § 107.
[1978] 3 W.L.R. at 739-40.
Id. at 739-41.
Id. at 739-40.
Id.
Id. at 743-44.
Id.
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of private consensual dispute resolution. 173 The Anisminic and
Harrow School cases, however, show a judicial boldness that may
carry over to a review of commercial arbitration. Judges straining
for the "right result" in a case may find a broad definition of excess of authority a convenient way to justify intervention.
English appellate court resistance to such back door methods of
judicial intervention may be indicated by the recent Court of Appeal decision in Moran v. Lloyd's. 17 4 The case involved an award
finding an underwriter of the Lloyd's insurance syndicate guilty of
discreditable conduct for which he was suspended. The underwriter challenged the award for alleged arbitrator "misconduct,"
consisting of a finding on a basis not put forward by Lloyd's. The
judgment given by the Master of the Rolls, Sir John Donaldson,
stressed that inconsistency in an arbitrator's reasoning might constitute error of fact or law, but not "misconduct."
III.

CONCLUSION

F. Scott Fitzgerald wrote that "the test of a first-rate intelligence
is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same
time, and still retain the ability to function. ' 175 Elaboration of an
appropriate standard of interaction between judge and arbitrator
requires a similar capacity to accept seemingly inconsistent principles: although the law must be applied correctly, arbitration must
be binding. The commercial community's need for finality in the
resolution of private disputes inevitably competes with the desirability of uniform application of law.
English arbitration law, which has been examined as an example
of lex loci arbitri,still leaves the high court with sufficient power
to justify almost any intervention in an arbitration despite an "exclusion agreement." The arbitrator is left between the Scylla of illdefined autonomy and the Charybdis of unknown judicial supervision. Therefore, the High Court's power to set aside awards on the
vague ground of arbitrator "misconduct" should be replaced by a
provision allowing awards to be challenged only for clearly enumer-

173.
[1981]
174.
175.

Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau Und Maschinenfabrik v. South India Shipping Corp.,
1 All E.R. 289, 295-96 (Diplock, L.J.).
The Times (London), Mar. 3, 1983, at 10, col. 1.
F. Fitzgerald, The Crack-Up 69 (E. Wilson ed. 1945).
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ated procedural deficiencies, 17 6 or for a fundamental discord between what or how the arbitrator decided and what or how the
parties authorized him to decide. Admittedly, rules flexible enough
to be useful may not deter an aggressive judge straining to impose
what he sees as the right result in a controversy. Nonetheless,
guidelines would provide arbitration lawyers with a greater measure of predictability.
Wisdom dictates that the State of arbitration exercise some control over the integrity of the proceedings and the interests of third
parties. Prima facie validity is accorded foreign arbitral awards
under the New York Convention. Arbitral law clearly should not
permit the loser to litigate issues such as arbitrator corruption in
every jurisdiction in which he holds assets. But rather than focus
on unusual local rules that foreign parties are unlikely to have
foreseen in choosing the seat of arbitration, courts should confine
themselves to ensuring respect for traditional standards of fairness,
limits on the arbitrator's authority, and rights of third parties.

176. Similar grounds for challenging awards are now contained in French and U.S. law.
See supra notes 16 & 41.

